Abstract-This paper describes a system for criminal identification that utilizes a large number of wireless local area network (LAN) access points and cameras. The proposed "Criminal Fishing system" identifies the media access control (MAC) address of a culprit's device from probe request signals captured by access points during the period in which a culprit remains near the incident scene. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system could identify the culprit MAC address 10 out of 10 times in an indoor experiment and 8 out of 8 times in an outdoor experiment, in case that the culprit's radio wave fingerprint could be captured.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the importance of traffic offloading from cellular networks to Wi-Fi networks is increasing due to the rapid growth of network traffic [1] caused by widely distributed smartphones and tablet devices. To extend Wi-Fi coverage areas, significant numbers of Wi-Fi access points (APs) are being installed in urban areas.
Criminal activities, such as graffiti, shoplifting, purse snatching, and kidnapping, occur in urban areas. These incidents cause various types of social damage. For example, the total recovery cost for graffiti is approximately 12 billion USD per year in the United States [2] . The costs incurred by shoplifting are 461.5 billion yen per year in Japan [3] and 44 billion USD per year in the United States [4] . We consider that utilizing large numbers of APs in urban areas as a component of a criminal investigation assistance system can reduce the incidents of criminal activity and improve public safety. This paper introduces a criminal identification system that utilizes Wi-Fi APs.
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND

A. Existing crime prevention/detection systems
Security cameras that capture photos or videos are widely used as security equipment. However, installation costs tend to be expensive, particularly when several cameras are installed and connected to a network. Another typical problem with security cameras is that a culprit whose face is hidden cannot be identified from the images. This issue cannot be resolved by placing a large number of cameras in a surveillance area.
There are some sensor-based methods for crime detection. Park et al. [5] proposed a method that utilizes wearable sensors, i.e., heartbeat and temperature sensors. Combining these sensors and closed-circuit television, their proposed method Hiroaki Togashi is with the Faculty of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan (corresponding author to provide phone: +81-92-802-3571; fax: +81-92-802-3596; e-mail: togashi@mobcom.ait.kyushu-u.ac.jp).
Yasuaki Koga was with the Graduate School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan. He is now with detects and records criminal behavior. iProtect [6] is a type of anomaly activity detection that utilizes sensors on a target's smartphone. Specifically, the method utilizes an accelerometer to detect criminal behavior by identifying differences in the activities of daily living. To detect criminal behavior, these sensor-based methods require attaching sensing equipment to the target's body, or installing special software on a target's smartphone. Therefore, these methods are not practical because culprits will disable the crime detection software or equipment before perpetrating a crime. We aim to develop a system that is capable of identifying a culprit if their smartphone is turned on.
B. PCWL-0200
PCWL-0200 [7] , which employs wireless backhaul technology, is a wireless local area network (LAN) AP developed in our laboratory. This AP can extend the wireless LAN coverage area without installing a significant number of LAN cables. The PCWL-0200 AP can capture probe request signals transmitted from surrounding mobile devices.
C. Probe request signal
There are two methods to establish connection between Wi-Fi devices and APs, i.e., active and passive scanning. In active scanning, a device broadcasts a probe request and listens for a probe response from surrounding APs. When a probe response is received, a connection can be established. Passive scanning utilizes beacons broadcast periodically from APs to establish a connection. Most smartphones broadcast probe request signals at random intervals to execute active scan and establish a connection quickly. How frequently a Wi-Fi device broadcasts a probe request signal differs according to the type of device, connection status, operating system, software, etc. Generally, the transmission interval varies from seconds to minutes. A device tends to broadcast probe request signals more frequently when it is not connected to an AP and its display is turned on.
The following information can be obtained by analyzing a probe request signal:
Sender media access control (MAC) address Received signal strength indication (RSSI) Extended service set identifier (only when explicitly declared)
Since a probe request signal contains the MAC address unique to a specific device, we refer to it as a "radio wave fingerprint." The radio wave fingerprint for each device can be collected when its Wi-Fi functionality is activated. Currently, there are approximately 3.4 billion smartphones in active use in the world [1] . This means that the radio wave fingerprint of approximately one-half of the people in the world can be collected. Thus, we considered that a security surveillance system can be achieved by analyzing captured probe request signals.
III. CRIMINAL FISHING SYSTEM
A. System outline
The proposed "Criminal Fishing system" identifies a culprit by utilizing radio wave fingerprints in addition to incident scene photos. This system employs PCWL-0200s as APs to set up a surveillance area and gather radio wave fingerprints. The system also employs universal serial bus (USB) cameras to capture photos near each AP. These fingerprints and photos are transmitted to an administrative server with a timestamp. When a user, e.g., facility administrator, notices an incident, they check the photos and determine the time of incident. The system extracts the culprit's radio wave fingerprint from a huge number of fingerprints gathered around the time of incident. The culprit's appearance and face can be recognized by the photos taken when the extracted radio wave fingerprint is obtained even if their appearance cannot be recognized around the incident scene. Figure 1 shows the components of the Criminal Fishing system. Each AP gathers radio wave fingerprints and periodically transmits them to the administrative server. The AP also runs an image processing program that captures photos when the program recognizes moving objects. These photos are also transmitted to the server. The photos and the radio wave fingerprints are stored in a database on the server. An administrator uses a web application on the server to determine the period that the culprit was near the incident scene, i.e., the time of incident, by checking the stored photos. The administrative server identifies the culprit's MAC address from the huge number of collected radio wave fingerprints. Identifiability of the culprit can be improved by increasing the density of APs.
B. System components
The culprit's image can be obtained by surveilling their radio wave fingerprint in several surveillance areas and capturing photos when the fingerprints are obtained. Therefore, the system can recognize a culprit's appearance and face even if it cannot be recognized at the surveillance area includes the incident scene.
C. Culprit determination algorithm 1) Outline
Each AP collects a culprit's radio wave fingerprint, as well as the fingerprints of a huge number of other people. The fingerprints for other devices are roughly categorized as follows: Device-1 does not move. Device-2 is some distance away from the camera. Device-3 is a short distance from the camera.
A device-1 MAC address is always observed by a certain AP regardless of time. On the contrary, a culprit's device will leave the incident scene, and then its MAC address will not be observed by an AP near the scene. Therefore, device-1 fingerprints can be filtered out by determining the period that the culprit remains around the incident scene from the photos, and filtering out the MAC addresses observed while the culprit is not observed at the scene.
Device-2 is a considerable distance from an AP, compared to the culprit's device; thus, the RSSI for signals from these devices will be lower than that of the culprit's. Therefore, device-2 fingerprints can be filtered out by setting a lower RSSI threshold.
Device-3 can be categorized as device-3-1, i.e., a device belonging to a person who behaves differently than the culprit in another AP's area, and device-3-2, i.e., a device belonging to a person who behaves similarly to the culprit in the other AP's area. Device-3-1 fingerprints can be filtered out by filtering the MAC addresses that are not commonly observed by all APs in a given surveillance area. In contrast, it is not necessary to filter out device-3-2 fingerprints because we consider that such fingerprints indicate accomplices or victims; device-3-2 fingerprints can be used to identify the culprit and clarify details about the incident. If bystanders' MAC addresses are included in the filtered results, they can be filtered out as follows. Their appearance can be recognized by checking the photos captured when the addresses were observed at a certain place. If they are recognized as an unrelated person, their MAC address can be removed from culprit candidates.
On considering the filtering algorithm, we focused on the two performance indices, i.e., culprit identification rate (True Positive) and nonculprit misidentification rate (False Positive). Misidentification results in an innocent bystander becoming entangled in a criminal investigation and will increase opposition to practical application of the system. Therefore, achieving a low misidentification rate should take priority over achieving a high identification rate.
2) Linear weighted filtering
We propose "linear weighted filtering" to determine a culprit's MAC address. Linear weighted filtering uses the "suspicious rate," an index that shows the probability that a given MAC address is the culprit's address. The suspicious rate is calculated for each MAC address based on the time at which the address was observed. The probability that the culprit's fingerprint will be collected by a PCWL around an incident scene, is expected to decrease relative to the elapsed time from which the culprit was recognized as staying at the given location. Therefore, identification of the culprit will be more accurate by increasing the value to the increment of the "suspicious rate," relative to the elapsed time. We refer to this weighting method as "Linear weighting," and its value change over time is shown as Fig. 2 . The value is linearly increased according to the elapsed time from the culprit staying duration.
Linear weighted filtering calculates the difference among the MAC addresses observed during the "culprit staying duration" and that observed during the "culprit nonstaying duration" (Fig. 3) . These durations are defined by determining the times at which a culprit enters and exits the vicinity of the given incident scene. The stored photos are used to determine the durations. Since the addresses included in the differential set are likely to be the culprit's, linear weighting increments their suspicious rate. This method divides the culprit nonstaying duration into 30 s intervals, and this calculation is performed for each time slot. The addresses whose suspicious rates are greater than the threshold are extracted as candidate culprit MAC addresses. If a bystander has behaved similarly to the culprit with a time difference, the linear weighting value becomes lower when the temporal difference between the bystander's behavior and the culprit's behavior increases. Therefore, the bystander's address can be distinguished from the culprit's address, even if the bystander's suspicious rate exceeds the threshold.
The MAC addresses observed during the "eliminating duration" (Fig. 2) are not considered candidates because they are considered the addresses of stationary devices. The eliminating duration is defined as 45 min before and after the culprit nonstaying duration. Through this calculation, all device-1 fingerprints are filtered out from the candidates because they will continue to be observed during the eliminating duration.
Linear weighted filtering also utilizes the maximum RSSI of the signals broadcast from each device. The MAC addresses whose maximum RSSI values observed at the culprit staying duration are less than the threshold, are filtered out from the candidates. Therefore, device-2 fingerprints are filtered out from the candidates because the RSSI of these MAC addresses is lower than the threshold.
This filtering is performed on all APs in a given surveillance area. Summation of the suspicious rate is calculated only for MAC addresses whose suspicious rates on all APs are greater than the threshold. The filtering results are presented in a table that consists of a MAC address, its suspicious rate for each AP, and the sum of the rates. Device-3-1 fingerprints are filtered out because the suspicious rates obtained for some APs will be less than the threshold. By utilizing the suspicious rate, an administrator can determine which MAC address is most likely to be the culprit's when several addresses appear in the filtering results.
By setting a lower threshold for the suspicious rate, a bystander's MAC address will not be shown among the candidates because bystander's suspicious rate is expected to be relatively small. Misidentification rate can be decreased by setting an optimal threshold, even if the culprit does not hold Wi-Fi enabled device or the culprit disables the Wi-Fi function on their device.
3) Linear weighted filtering details
This section describes the details of linear weighted filtering with formulae.
Notations:
: the set of PCWLs placed in a surveillance area and observed a culprit's appearance and disappearance : the size of set : each PCWL placed in the area : the set of PCWLs placed inside PCWL p i 's radio wave range : "culprit appearance time," i.e., the time at which a culprit first appears in a photo captured by the camera on PCWL : "culprit disappearance time," i.e., the time at which the culprit last appeared in a photo.
: the set of MAC addresses observed by PCWL at time : the set of MAC addresses observed three min relative to : the set observed three min relative to : the earliest culprit appearance time in the PCWL set : the latest culprit disappearance time in the PCWL set Set , i.e., the set of MAC addresses observed during the culprit staying duration, is obtained as (1) . This formula means that the minimum duration to gather radio wave fingerprints is two min. If the culprit staying duration is longer than three min, is defined as the union set of the MAC addressed observed three min relative to and .
(1)
Where
The suspicious rate is calculated for each MAC address in set , by referring to the culprit's appearance during the culprit nonstaying duration at PCWL . The duration is defined as the duration before or the duration after , which are defined as (2-1) and (2-2). This definition for culprit nonstaying duration is obtained by considering a case in which the culprit has stayed in the blind spot of a PCWL, which is inside its radio wave range and outside the camera shooting range. The MAC addresses observed during the eliminating duration are obtained by calculating the union set of the following MAC address sets.
: the MAC address set observed between : the set observed between Using their union set, the final set is obtained as (4) . (4) , the associative array on PCWL (Table 1) , is obtained as follows. Its key value consists of the elements of set , and the value consists of the maximum RSSI and the suspicious rate calculated from the differential sets . To calculate the suspicious rate, the proposed method employs linear weighting, which is a method that increases the value incremented on the suspicious rate according to the elapsed time of the culprit staying duration. Specifically, linear weighting for each is defined as (5) . This means that the weight increases linearly, and the value is standardized to make the maximum suspicious rate equal to the number of differential sets. (5) The duration to obtain the maximum RSSI is defined as follows. If , the duration is , and if , the duration is .
Once is obtained, the elements whose suspicious rate or maximum RSSI is lower than the threshold are removed from the array. The threshold for the suspicious rate is defined as the value obtained when a MAC address is observed only once at either end of the culprit nonstaying duration. (6) For example, as shown in Table 1 , MAC addresses 2 and 3 are removed from the associative array by this threshold. The threshold for RSSI is −70 dBm, which is observed when a device is placed 20 m from an AP and is in its line-of-sight. When the observed RSSI is lower than −70 dBm, the device can be considered as not being in the shooting range of the camera attached to the AP. Note that, as seen in Table 1 , MAC address 4 is eliminated from the array by this threshold.
The same calculation is performed on the other PCWLs, and the resultant table (Table 2) is created by aggregating the MAC addresses that are common among tables . The resultant table is a candidate list for the culprit's MAC address. 
IV. EVALUATIONS
A. Indoor experiment 1) Experimental settings
An indoor experiment was conducted to evaluate the proposed Criminal Fishing system. Location of the experiment was the 8th floor of the West 2nd building at the Kyushu University Ito campus. The surveillance area was set up with four PCWLs as shown in Fig. 4 . Specifically, one PCWL, referred to as the "core," was used to aggregate data communication to the database server. The other three PCWLs, referred to as "slaves," captured probe request signals. A single-board computer (PandaBoard [8] ) was used to capture photos with its USB camera, because image-capturing program consumes so much computational resources of the PCWLs that the APs' communication functions are interrupted. Each PandaBoard and slave PCWL was placed at the same location. A simulated culprit held a mobile device with functional Wi-Fi and walked along the predefined route that passes near all slave PCWLs. The experiment was performed 10 times using 10 different devices that were set to broadcast probe request signals frequently. Afterwards, identification of the culprit's MAC address was performed using the Criminal Fishing system web application. Table 4 shows the results of the indoor experiment. The results indicate that the proposed method identified the culprit's MAC address 10 out of 10 times. Note that there are many Wi-Fi devices around the experiment place; approximately 50 MAC addresses were always observed. The proposed Criminal Fishing system was able to identify the culprit's MAC address in such an environment.
2) Experimental results
B. Outdoor Experiment
To obtain further findings, we conducted an outdoor experiment in a more practical environment.
1) Experimental settings
The outdoor experiment was conducted at the Open Learning Plaza at the Kyushu University Ito campus. A surveillance area was set up with six PCWL-0200s as shown in Fig. 5 . One PCWL was used to aggregate data communication to the database server, and the other five PCWLs captured probe request signals. In the outdoor experiment, five single-board computers (four PandaBoards and one Raspberry Pi [9] ) were used to capture photos. The simulated culprit walked in the surveillance area while trying to blend into the crowd. The other settings were the same as those used in the indoor experiment. Table 6 shows the results of the outdoor experiment. In Table 6 , "No. of PCWLs used in identification" indicates the number of PCWLs that were able to capture photos and execute the filtering algorithm. The proposed method successfully identified the culprit's MAC address 8 out of 8 times, in case that the culprit's device has transmitted probe request signals (trials 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10), i.e., their radio wave fingerprints could be captured. The proposed system was able to prevent from misidentifying the bystander's MAC addresses as the culprit's address, under the condition that the culprit's device has not transmitted probe request signals (in the fourth and ninth trials). Therefore, the proposed method achieved high culprit identification rate and low non-culprit misidentification rate simultaneously.
2) Experimental results
In this experiment, not all of the single-board computers were able to capture or transmit photos to the server. We consider that main causes of this phenomenon were unstable signal strength and instability of the single-board computer. However, for practical application, the proposed system is required to be robust against this situation. The results of the outdoor experiment revealed that the proposed system can accurately identify a culprit's MAC address and prevent from misidentifying bystander's MAC address, in a practical environment.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Issues for practical use
We consider that two major issues remain that must be addressed before the proposed system is ready for practical application. The first is omission of capturing a culprit's radio wave fingerprint. In the experiments, the devices were set to broadcast probe request signals frequently to ensure that the PCWLs could capture the culprit's radio wave fingerprint. However, in practical situations, some PCWLs may frequently be unable to capture the culprit's radio wave fingerprint. Currently, the proposed method must only use the PCWLs that captured the culprit's radio wave fingerprint and their photo, to identify the culprit's MAC address.
The other issue is increase of the misidentification rate according to the decreasing number of PCWLs for culprit identification. In the experiments, a simulated culprit walked around the surveillance area while passing all PCWLs that captures radio wave fingerprints. However, a real culprit does not always walk in an area while passing nearby APs. The culprit identification rate of the proposed method may decrease in such a situation. On the other hand, this number can be used as an index to measure the reliability of the identification result. We consider that it is possible to avoid innocent bystanders being entangled in criminal investigations by both referring to the identification results and considering the number of PCWLs used in identification.
B. Social effects of the proposed system
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system can identify a culprit's MAC address accurately when the culprit has a device with an active Wi-Fi. According to the literature [1] , 3.4 billion smartphones are actively used worldwide, and mobile broadband subscriptions have reached 3.6 billion. In short, nearly one-half of the people in the world use devices that broadcast probe request signals. On the basis of the experimental results, the proposed system can identify the MAC address of approximately 50% of the people in the area that the system can be installed, i.e., the area covered by the APs capable of capturing probe request signals. In urban areas, a significant number of Wi-Fi APs are being installed, and these APs will be replaced with more sophisticated APs in near future. Therefore, the system is anticipated to be effective for approximately one-half of the criminal incidents that occur in urban areas; it will be a strong deterrent against criminal incidents in cities. We also consider that the AP based criminal prevention system is advantageous, because the culprits will less beware of the location of the APs compared to the ordinal security equipment when they perpetrates a crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed the Criminal Fishing system, which utilizes radio wave fingerprints gathered by densely placed APs. Specifically, the proposed system identifies a culprit's MAC address based on the suspicious rate, which is calculated on the basis of the appearance of each MAC address observed around the time of the given incident. The experimental results show that the proposed method could identify a culprit's MAC address 10 out of 10 times in an indoor experiment and 8 out of 8 times in an outdoor experiment, in case that the culprit's device transmitted probe request signals frequently.
In the future, we plan to further improve the proposed system assuming a more practical environment, modification of the system intended for specific incidents, and deeper discussion of the social effects of the Criminal Fishing system.
